



THREE SYSTEMS OF LAND-USE
CONTROL
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON**
A year ago, I spoke at a Federalist Society conference on
"Constitutional Protections of Economic Liberty."' On that oc-
casion, I chastised the organizers for having fallen prey to the
Beltway Syndrome.2 This syndrome, which mainly afflicts resi-
dents of the Washington, D.C., area, is the tendency to exag-
gerate the importance of the federal government to folks in the
hinterland. That conference had been proceeding mostly as if
the United States Constitution were the only constitution we
have. I pointed out that James Madison, whose silhouette
graces the Federalist Society banner, would be shocked at the
group's snubbing of state constitutions. Because Federalists are
committed to the decentralization of political power, I argued
that they should pay more attention to subfederal law.
This Conference is an improvement on this score. Most
property law is state, not federal, law. The Beltway Syndrome
nevertheless subtly pervades these proceedings. The prior
panel was entitled "Property and the Constitution," as if there
were only one constitution. All seven conference panelists
known for their work in government have been or are em-
ployed by thefederal government-four as judges and three as
administrators (two in the Justice Department and one in the
Interior Department). I suggest, only half jokingly, that the
Federalist Society might consider moving its headquarters from
its present location inside the Beltway to Peoria or Lubbock or
some other city that is an antipode of Washington, D.C.
* This panel was introduced by Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit.
** Waiter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Ellickson, The Legal Dimensions of the Privatization Movement, 12 GEO. MASON U.L.
REv. 157 (1988).
2. See id. at 163-64.
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I. AGENCY-ENFORCED PROPERTY, BLACKSTONIAN PROPERTY,
AND INFORMAL PROPERTY
My panel's topic is "Regulation and Property: Allies or Ene-
mies?" This topic seems to throw red meat to libertarians, to
whom "property" connotes what is good and "regulation,"
what is bad. What we ordinarily think of as private property,
however, is a form of regulation. Consider rights in land, the
resource that will be the focus of my remarks. I will refer to the
system of land rights that prevailed before the rise of the regu-
latory state as "Blackstonian property." Suppose, contrary to
fact, that this system operated as Blackstone implied it did in
his most unrestrained passages.' If so, a landowner would have
an absolute power to exclude others and an absolute right to
use his land as he wished. Is this a world without regulation?
Not at all. Blackstonian property rests on, indeed consists of, a
set of government regulations that prohibits outsiders from
trespassing, encroaching, or otherwise interfering with a land-
owner's possession and use of land.
Blackstonian property does not seem "regulatory" because its
maintenance does not depend on the actions of a specialized
regulatory bureaucracy. For clarity, it may be useful to distin-
guish three general types of controls on behavior: (1) agency-
enforced regulations, (2) Blackstonian property, and (3) infor-
mal norms. Each involves a different standard enforcer. Statism
is at a peak when specialized government agencies draft and
enforce regulations. Zoning, a topic taken up shortly, is almost
entirely a system of "agency-enforced regulation." "Black-
stonian property" is less statist than agency-enforced regula-
tion because the rules against trespass, encroachment, and
other interferences are enforced mainly through private civil
actions, not state-conducted criminal prosecutions. Land-use
controls arising out of covenants and nuisance doctrine-com-
mon-law devices that evolved to modify absolute Blackstonian
land rights-are also privately enforced.
In some contexts, the common law authorized a landowner
to exercise self-help. For example, a landowner was deemed
privileged to use reasonable force to expel an unprivileged en-
trant.4 Self-help enforcement of legal rules is even more decen-
3. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-35; 2 id. at *2-8; 3 id. at *209.
4. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 21 (5th ed. 1984).
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tralized than private litigation because it relies on the muscles
of persons other than government officers. A person can exer-
cise self-help to enforce, not legal rules, but rather extralegal
norms on the possession and use of resources. When this hap-
pens in a patterned way, "informal norms" create informal
property rights.
Informal property plays a far larger role in our society than is
usually appreciated. Land tenure systems can arise informally.
For example, at crowded public playgrounds, elaborate infor-
mal property rights usually evolve to govern the use of basket-
ball courts. Informal social forces, not state agents, have
subdivided the rich lobster grounds off the coast of Maine.5 In
ancient Iceland, possessors of land presumably relied mostly
on threat of informal force to deter others from trespassing.
The squatters who create shantytowns in Latin America set up
informal land-tenure systems. That animals exhibit territorial-
ity provides extrinsic evidence that functional land rights can
arise without the involvement of a state.
To undertake a normative comparison of informal, Black-
stonian, and agency-enforced controls, one must articulate
one's values. An advocate of the utmost decentralization of
power might conclude that informal norms are superior to a
more formalized property system even when the latter would
better help people coordinate their affairs. I generally adopt a
utilitarian perspective when appraising the details of systems of
social control. To a utilitarian, no particular form of control is
invariably ideologically correct, and none is invariably an "en-
emy." Instead of making those sorts of broad categorical judg-
ments, a utilitarian must analyze which system would best help
people cooperate to mutual advantage in the context under ex-
amination. To be concrete, I will discuss in the balance of my
remarks a specific problem: the coordination of neighboring
land-use activities.' In the United States, far more government
officials are involved in the crafting of these regulations than of
any other kind. Observers afflicted with the Beltway Syndrome
might not know this because land-use regulation is largely the
province of scattered state and local governments.
5. SeeJ. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49, 73-77, 142-44 (1988).
6. Many of the issues to be discussed here are examined in greater depth in Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
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II. ZONING OFFICIALS AND LANDOWNERS: ALLIES OR ENEMIES?
In 1900, there was no zoning in the United States. Today,
some 10,000 localities employ zoning to regulate land uses,
building bulks, lot sizes, and the like. A familiar Pigovian argu-
ment attempts to justify, on utilitarian grounds, this regulatory
blossoming. According to the argument, when property is
Blackstonian, externalities from land-use activities cause mar-
kets to fail because unregulated landowners ignore the costs
and benefits of their activities to neighbors. In practice, say
modern-day Pigovians, Coasean bargaining among neighbor-
ing landowners will rarely prevent this sort of failure. Many
land uses affect the welfare of a large number of neighbors.
However the common-law rights of landowners might be re-
fined with nuisance law, these neighbors are simply too numer-
ous to act collectively. Therefore, concludes the Pigovian
argument, specialized government agencies should be created
to regulate land use in the public interest. So conceived, this
agency-enforced supplement to private property rights would
prove to be a friend of private landowners.
Because zoning is so decentralized, generalizations about it
are hazardous.7 Nevertheless, I am willing to assert that much
of current zoning practice is not utilitarian. The Pigovian ra-
tionale for zoning has proved to be superficial in two respects:
It underestimated the competence of decentralized landown-
ers, and it overestimated the competence of zoning officials.
A. Landowner Coordination Without Agency Supervision
Although little research has been done on the topic, impres-
sionistic data suggest that Blackstonian landowners can coordi-
nate to mutual advantage more easily than has usually been
thought. Today, when subdividing a large tract of land, a devel-
oper is likely to draft a set of covenants restricting land uses
and to set up a private association to administer them. A devel-
oper is likely to be better informed about its own land parcel
and more motivated to maximize the parcel's value than local
7. The complexity of the zoning system may have scared my co-panelists, Dick Stew-
art and Jim Krier, into the Beltway Syndrome field of environmental law, where a
scholar can focus mostly on a single set of national regulations. See Stewart, Pnivprop,
Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 91 (1990); Krier, The (Unlikely) Death of
Property, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 75 (1990).
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officials are.' Covenants are therefore likely to be more utilita-
rian than zoning regulations in controlling land uses in parcel
interiors.9
The imposition of new covenants is impractical in established
urban neighborhoods where landholdings are fragmented. Pri-
vate nuisance actions are also likely to be cumbersome for mi-
nor annoyances in these locales. The failure of Blackstonian
property in older urban neighborhoods, however-, hardly cre-
ates an airtight case for the practice of zoning. There is a third
alternative: informal property rights. Zoning advocates have tended
to underestimate the power of informal norms to constrain unneighborly
land-use activities in established neighborhoods.
Why are most homeowners concerned with keeping the
fronts of their houses nicely painted and landscaped? Fear of
the lash of law? Surely not. Governments intervene in these
matters only in extreme cases. At work here, rather, are power-
ful norms of neighborliness. Neighbors themselves informally
enforce these norms through gossip and other self-help ac-
tions. Particularly when neighborhoods are close-knit, informal
norms of neighborliness may take the rough edges off Black-
stonian property rights in a more cost-justified manner than
zoning officials would. My casual examination of block maps of
residential neighborhoods developed in the prezoning era sug-
gests that landowners then' engaged in much informal coordi-
nation. Lot sizes, building bulks, and land uses were less
disruptive than one might have thought. Bernard Siegan's
study of Houston, the only large United States city currently
without zoning, suggests that this would continue to be true
today. 0 Because little research has been done on informal
land-use controls, however, it is hard to speak with confidence
about their relative effectiveness.
B. The Fallibility of Zoning Officials
Advocates of agency control of land uses, besides underap-
preciating the self-help enforcement of norms, tend to have an
inflated view of what can be expected of local regulators. Zon-
ing officials may stumble, just as markets can. Zoning is likely to
8. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
9. Covenants work less well in controlling effects on outsiders.
10. See Siegan, Non-Zoiing in Houston, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 71 (1970).
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misallocate land, involve undue administrative costs, and
prompt wasteful and arbitrary rentseeking.
Who can better deal with a pending land-use controversy on
a particular site-local officials or owners of land in the neigh-
borhood of the site? Zoning officials are less likely than a multi-
tude of neighbors to be beset by collective-action problems.
On the other hand, neighborhood landowners have two signifi-
cant comparative advantages as decisionmakers. First, because
they live (or at least own land) in the area, neighbors are likely
to know more than zoning officials about the characteristics of
the development site, the neighborhood, and the people in-
volved. Second, landowners and neighbors as a group bear (at
least most of) the costs and benefits of appropriately resolving
a land-use issue. Although zoning officials have some political
stake in achieving a utilitarian result, they lack the sharp eco-
nomic and social stake that landowners have. Regulators are
more likely than neighboring landowners, for example, to re-
strict undeveloped land to open-space uses, in part because
regulators do not "feel" the costs of taking away development
rights. Regulators would be more likely to consider these costs,
of course, if they were constitutionally required to pay for
them. Usually they are not. An Illinois court, for example, has
sustained a minimum lot-size requirement of 160 acres, an area
equivalent to about 25 city blocks."
A suburb's zoning officials tend to heed the suburb's current
residents, who make up its electorate. Conversely, zoning offi-
cials tend to be insensitive to the interests of nonresidents,
such as housing consumers and owners of undeveloped land,
who also have a stake in the suburb's land-development mar-
ket.'When a suburb's zoning decisions affect these nonresi-
dents, public regulation becomes a potential source of
externalities, not simply a means for internalizing them. There
is abundant evidence that the large-lot zoning characteristic of
many suburbs makes metropolitan areas sprawl further than
they otherwise would, inflates the price of housing, and segre-
gates people by social class. 2
The administrative costs of zoning, moreover, are significant.
A government that zones must staff its agencies, rule on permit
11. See Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981)
(lot-size minimum held rationally related to permitted police-power objectives).
12. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CoNTROLs 795-859 (1981).
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applications, weigh reports, hold public hearings, and so qn.
The increasing webs of regulation have made the land-develop-
ment process much more time-consuming than it, was in the
pre-zoning era. In addition, the Pigovian argument fails to an-
ticipate that zoning tends to become a rich trough at which
rentseekers of various breeds come to feed. Developers can en-
rich themselves by securing unexpected approvals from politi-
cians willing to exchange zoning concessions for campaign
contributions or personal payoffs. Indeed, in a regime of
agency-regulated property, a developer's ability to market a
project to politicians is often more of a key to entrepreneurial
success than is an ability to market a project to consumers.
Land-use hearings may attract other interest groups who
glimpse a chance to grab some of the rents that development
projects generate. In Manhattan, for example, theater groups
have sought to obtain subsidies for live theatre."3 In New Ha-
ven, union executives have asked that the city not approve a
hotel unless the developer agrees in advance not to fight the
unionization of the hotel's staff. 4 More and more cities have
begun to require developers to contribute to housing trust
funds. These housing-linkage programs are largely an effort by
professional housers to sustain the production of inefficient,
subsidized housing projects.' 5
C. Is Zoning Ever a Friend of Property?
Zoning undoubtedly often operates to enhance the value of
existing homes. This is why zoning is so popular, and why most
law students who are currently members of the Federalist Soci-
ety will defend zoning after they become homeowners. I have
argued, however, that the various costs of zoning are likely to
swamp its benefits in many contexts. Zoning is particularly
likely to fail when its costs are borne mostly by the politically
weak, such as persons not entitled to vote in local elections.
When localized disputes arise within close-knit neighborhoods,
13. See Lesk, Lessons for the Housing Trust Fund from the Theatre Fund Proposal, in INCLU-
SIONARV ZONING MovEs DowNTowN 169 (D. Merriam, D. Brower & P. Tegeler eds.
1985). See generally Waldman, Cities Are Pressured to Make Developers Share Their Wealth,
Wall St.J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (describing exactions for art museums, child-care
facilities, and other services).
14. See Should Aldermen Intervene in Union Organizing at Inn?, New Haven Reg., Feb. 12,
1989, at B3, col. 2.
15. See Ellickson, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Yet Another Misguided Urban Policy?, in
INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DowNTowN, supra note 13, at 83.
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agency officials are also unlikely to outperform informal coor-
dination by decentralized landowners. On the other hand,
agency regulation (or taxation) may be a useful complement to
Blackstonian property in contexts where externalities are per-
vasive, as is typically the case with, for example, air and water
pollution. Nevertheless, on balance, a utilitarian should see in
the burgeoning land-use regulation system the countenance of
an enemy, not a friend.
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